Stunning advancements in biotechnology, particularly in gene editing and pathogen engineering, have opened bright horizons for humanity. However, alongside these brilliant achievements, a serious and emerging concern has arisen: how can we ensure that this valuable research does not inadvertently or intentionally transform into destructive tools or threats to public health and security? This concern lies at the heart of the "dual-use" concept; a situation where science, whether consciously or negligently, can cause irreparable harm. Unfortunately, current legal and supervisory frameworks are often reactive, intervening only after a disaster has occurred. This study proposes a preventive, three-layered model. The first layer consists of technical biosecurity criteria to assess pathogenicity risks. The second layer involves research ethics, which examines the balance between public benefit and potential risks. The third layer is criminal law, which defines criminal acts by drawing clear red lines. The integration of these three pillars creates an operational "decision-making algorithm" that assists supervisory bodies in taking proportionate actions based on the identified risk level, ranging from routine monitoring to project suspension or referral to judicial authorities. The ultimate goal is to preserve scientific freedoms and create a safe space for scientific flourishing, thereby maintaining public trust and preventing laboratory achievements from turning into public nightmares.